We formalize a solution concept called interim partially correlated rationalizability (IPCR), which was implicitly discussed in both Ely and Peski (2006) and Dekel et al. (2007) . IPCR allows for interim correlations, i.e., correlations that depend on opponents' types but not on the state of nature. As a direct extension of Ely and Peski's main result, we show that hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs are necessary and sufficient for the identification of IPCR. We use new proof techniques that better illustrate the connection between higher order beliefs and interim rationalizability.
Introduction
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choose hierarchies of beliefs about payoffs as the primitives of the game and use Harsanyi type spaces (Harsanyi (1967 (Harsanyi ( -1968 ) to model them. Solution concepts are then defined on type spaces. However, as is commonly known in the literature, under a fixed payoff structure of a game, type spaces that represent the same set of hierarchies of beliefs may give different Bayes Nash equilibrium predictions. 1 Two approaches are taken to restore the connection between solution concepts and information. Dekel et al. (2007) (hereafter, DFM) define interim correlated rationalizability (hereafter, ICR) and show that the conventional Mertens-Zamir hierarchy of beliefs of a type is sufficient for identifying the set of ICR actions of that type. 2 In their definition, a player may conjecture that her opponents' types, states of nature and opponents' actions could be arbitrarily correlated, as long as the correlation is consistent with her belief in the type space. In a parallel work, Ely and Peski (2006) (hereafter, EP) study interim independent rationalizability (hereafter, IIR) for two-player games, in which each player assumes that the opponent's action correlates with state of nature only through the opponent's type. They introduce ∆-hierarchy of beliefs which contains weakly richer information than conventional hierarchy of beliefs at any type and show that it is necessary and sufficient for IIR.
When there are more than two players, a player could conjecture that there are correlations among other players' strategies. 3 Unlike in games with complete information where the correlation takes a natural form, for games with incomplete information, there are multiple possibilities for correlations, depending on which type of information is given as the primitive. In particular, there are multiple ways of extending EP's formulation to games with more than two players, as is also discussed in Ely and Peski (2006) , section 7.2.
Following EP, we define interim partially correlated rationalizability (hereafter, IPCR) for n-player games by considering conjectures that involve only interim stage correlations. We assume that players view opponents' actions as type-contingent variables, and that a player's conjecture over opponents' actions and state of nature is induced by her belief in the type space together with a type-correlated strategy of the opponents'. A type-correlated strategy of the opponents' maps each profile of their types to a probability measure on their action profiles. If we take the agent-normal-form view of a type space, i.e., if we view each type of a player as an agent of that player, then the correlation in IPCR is similar to that permitted in the definition of correlated rationalizability for complete information games played by agents. We may also view the correlation we permit as interim correlation, while view that permitted by DFM as ex post correlation.
Our main result is a direct extension of EP's main theorem, in which we show that two types have the same interim partially correlated rationalizable behavior if and only if they have the same ∆-hierarchy of beliefs. In the n-player environment, ∆-hierarchy of beliefs is defined as the hierarchy of beliefs over conditional beliefs, where each conditional belief of a player is her belief over states of nature given a profile of her opponents' types. This result justifies the definition of IPCR, and also provides another connection between solution concepts and information.
Why do we need richer information to identify IPCR? Similar to the case of IIR, it is because conventional hierarchy of beliefs fails to capture certain correlations that potentially affect IPCR. We illustrate this with a simple but non-degenerate three-player game with incomplete information. This example also suggests the necessity of beliefs over conditional beliefs. 4 Example 1. Let Θ = f+1, 1g be the set of states of nature. Consider two type spaces that both model common knowledge of equal probability on θ = +1 and θ = 1. In type space T, T 1 = T 2 = T 3 = f g, and the common prior is µ[θ = +1] = µ[θ = 1] = 1 2 . In type spaceT,T 1 = f g,T 2 =T 3 = f+1, 1g, and the common priorμ onT 2 T 3 Θ is given by We use IPCR as the solution concept. When the type space is T, for example, in Player 1's conjecture, players 2 and 3 can play any type-correlated strategy σ 2,3 : Hence we see that at both type spaces, player 1 has the same conventional hierarchy of beliefs, but has different sets of IPCR actions. Essentially, player 2 and 3 can coordinate better at type spaceT because their types inT involve more correlation with θ. 6 We show explicitly in Example 2 that such correlation is captured by player 1's hierarchy of beliefs over conditional beliefs.
In the proof of our main theorem, we use techniques that are more transparent and make the connection between hierarchy of beliefs and interim rationalizability easier to understand. More specifically, in proving the sufficiency of ∆-hierarchy of beliefs for IPCR, we adapt DFM's proof of proving the sufficiency of conventional hierarchy of beliefs for ICR. From the proof, we see inductively that the k-th order belief of a player determines her k-th level feasible conjectures, hence determines her k-th level rationalizable actions. In proving the necessity part, we use a new technique that involves inductively constructing betting games to separate beliefs in the hierarchy. In a betting game that is constructed to separate a player's k-th order beliefs, we let her bet on opponents' actions 5 For any complete separable metric space X, ∆X is the space of Borel probability measures on X. 6 In fact, type spaceT can be generated through type space T using a simple state-dependent correlating device, which does not change players' hierarchies of beliefs (Liu (2012) ). However, if such a device is not a partially correlating device, then it changes players' hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs (Tang (2012) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model and basic definitions in Section 2, and the main result in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the relationship of this paper with Liu (2012) , the payoff equivalence between IPCR and the Bayesian solution-a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993) , and other related literature.
Model
We begin with some notations. For any Polish (or equivalently, complete separable metric) space X, let ∆X denote the space of Borel probability measures on the Borel σ-algebra of X endowed with the weak -topology. Let the product of two Polish spaces be endowed with the product Borel σ-algebra. Let supp µ be the support of a Borel probability measure µ, i.e., the smallest closed set with probability 1 under µ. For any measure µ 2 ∆(X Y), denote by marg X µ the marginal distribution of µ on X. For any measure µ 2 ∆X and
We study n-player games with incomplete information. The set of players is N = f1, 2, ..., ng. For each i 2 N, let i denote the set of i's opponents. Players play a game in which the payoffs are uncertain and parameterized by a finite set Θ. Each element θ 2 Θ is called a state of nature. For each i 2 N, denote by A i the finite set of actions for player i, and A i2N A i the set of action profiles. A (strategic form) game is a profile
, where for each i 2 N, g i : A Θ ! R is a payoff function for player i.
Let the set of finite games be denoted by G.
A type space over Θ is a tuple T = (T i , π i ) i2N , where for each i, T i is a compact metric space of types for player i and π i :
is a measurable mapping that describes player i's belief over opponents' types and states of nature for any type of player i. A strategy of player i is a mapping σ i :
profile, and with a little abuse of notation, let σ i : T i ! ∆A i be a type-correlated strategy of the opponents.
Throughout, given arbitrary x 2 X and y 2 Y, we use the notation π i (x)[y] to denote player i's belief about y conditional on x. More precisely, the object in the round bracket always denotes the object that player i conditions on, and the object in the square bracket always denotes the object that player i assigns probability to.
Interim partially correlated rationalizability
types, states of nature and opponents' actions such that marg
Rationalizability can be defined in many equivalent approaches; we adopt the iterative elimination of never best response actions procedure. At each round, an action a i of player i survives the elimination at type t i if it is a best response to some conjecture
and a type-correlated strategy σ i of the opponents, and at the type-correlated strategy, the opponents only play action profiles in A i that survived previous rounds of elimination.
Definition 1. Fix a game G and a type space T. For any t i 2
there exist v 2 ∆(T i Θ A i ) and a measurable type-correlated
are said to be interim partially correlated rationalizable (IPCR) at type t i .
Due to the same argument as that of Ely and Peski (2006) on the non-emptiness of IIR, R T i (t i jG) is non-empty. Hereafter, we suppress the notation G in R T i (t i jG) unless it is necessary for clarity.
The type-correlated strategy σ i : T i ! ∆A i deserves some clarification. We are not assuming that the opponents are sharing information with each other and are thus playing in a coordinated fashion. Instead, we take the view that the correlation may come from possibly correlated type-contingent extraneous signals that the opponents receive, or from player i's ignorance over the opponents' beliefs about each other's action (Aumann (1987) , section 6).
Hierarchies of beliefs
We first present Mertens and Zamir (1985) 's standard formulation of hierarchies of beliefs (see also Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) ), and based on that present Ely and Peski (2006) 's construction of ∆-hierarchies of beliefs. For convenience, we call Mertens-Zamir hierarchy of beliefs the conventional hierarchy of beliefs.
which is player i's belief over Θ at type
hierarchy of beliefs at type t i is defined as the profile h(
A ∆-hierarchy of beliefs describes a player's belief and higher-order beliefs over the set of conditional beliefs on states of nature. The concept was introduced by Ely and Peski (2006) in their study of interim independent rationalizability. We begin with defining conditional beliefs. Given belief π i (t i ) 2 ∆(T i Θ), the conditional belief of type t i over Θ, conditioning on the opponents' types being t i , is π i (t i )(t i ) 2 ∆Θ, also written as
possible conditional beliefs at t i . Type t i 's belief over T i then induces a belief over ∆Θ :
Now we can define ∆-hierarchy of beliefs at t i by treating the set of conditional beliefs ∆Θ as the set of basic uncertainties. Let the first-order belief of a player be her belief over the set of conditional beliefs, the second-order belief be her belief over opponents' beliefs over the set of conditional beliefs, and so on.
Formally, for any type space T = (T i , π i ) i2N on Θ, we can transform it into a type
In the new type space, players' types are unchanged, and
The conditional belief exists whenever Θ is a Polish space.
for any measurable subset S ∆(T i ∆Θ). Let the conventional hierarchy of beliefs at t i in the type space T ∆ be denoted by h(t i jT ∆ ).
Definition 2. For any type space T, for any k 1, let the k-th order ∆-hierarchy of beliefs at t i 2 T i be h k (t i jT ∆ ) and denote it by δ k (t i ). Also, let δ(t i ) = (δ 1 (t i ), ..., δ k (t i ), ...) denote the ∆-hierarchy of beliefs at t i .
By definition, δ(t i ) = h(t i jT ∆ ). For player i, we use δ i to denote the profile of opponents' ∆-hierarchies of beliefs.
Example 2. We revisit Example 1 to show that at type t 1 = , player 1 has different ∆-hierarchies of beliefs in type spaces T andT.
In the type space T, conditional on (t 2 , t 3 ) = ( , ), player 1's conditional belief on Θ is equal probability on each state, and her first-order belief (in the ∆-hierarchy of beliefs)
is certainty about the equal probability.
In the type spaceT, conditional on (t 2 ,t 3 ) = (+1, +1) or ( 1, 1), player 1's conditional belief on Θ is certainty about θ = +1. Simiarly, conditional on (t 2 ,t 3 ) = (+1, 1) or ( 1, +1), her conditional belief is certainty about θ = 1. Given her belief onT 2 T 3 , her first-order belief (in the ∆-hierarchy of beliefs) is equal probability on each certainty.
Rationalizability and hierarchies of beliefs
The following result shows that two types provide the same IPCR prediction if and only if they have the same ∆-hierarchy of beliefs.
The theorem is a direct extension of Ely and Peski (2006) 's main result (section 4, Theorem 2) from two-player games to n-player games. The sufficiency of ∆-hierarchy of beliefs says that it has incorporated all the information modeled in a type that would influence the type's IPCR behavior. The necessity condition, on the other hand, states that all the information characterized by ∆-hierarchy of beliefs matter for IPCR. If two types differ in any order of beliefs, there must be a game in which the types induce different sets of rationalizable actions.
Unlike Ely and Peski (2006) , who use abstract structures in the proof of the theorem, we use more straightforward techniques, especially for the part of necessity. We believe that these techniques will better illustrate the connection between hierarchies of beliefs and interim rationalizability.
In the proof of sufficiency, we closely follow Dekel et al. (2007) , in which they
show that conventional hierarchy of beliefs is sufficient for identifying interim correlated rationalizability. The intuition is as follows. Suppose there two types t i 2 T i and t 0 i 2 T 0 i .
For each conjecture v that is feasible at t i , it is supposed to be supported by some typecorrelated strategy σ i : T i ! ∆A i of the opponents. We show that as long as δ(t i ) = δ(t 0 i ), we can always construct σ 0 i : T 0 i ! ∆A i such that the conjecture v 0 generated by σ 0 i has the same marginal distribution on Θ A i as v does. More specifically, in the construction of σ 0 i , we let all t 0 i 's with the same conditional belief π 0 i (t 0 i , t 0 i ) = β 2 ∆Θ play the average strategy of the t i 's with π i (t i , t i ) = β.
In the proof of necessity, we use intermediate results from Ely and Peski (2006) and a technique that is inspired by Gossner and Mertens (2001) . 8 To be precise, we show that for each k, if δ k (t i ) 6 = δ k (t 0 i ), then we can construct a betting game G(δ k , δ 0k ) in which the two types have different sets of rationalizable actions. The construction is inductive.
Suppose we know how to construct games for the case of (k 1) and δ k (t i ) 6 = δ k (t 0 i ). In the k-th level games, we let player i play against the opponents who are playing (k 1)-th level games. It is a feasible conjecture for player i to believe that the opponents are choosing rationalizable type-correlated strategies that maximize her payoff. However, since types t i and t 0 i have different beliefs on opponents' (k 1)-th order beliefs, they have different sets of rationalizable beliefs. This gives us the leeway to construct level k betting games.
The same technique can be slightly adapted to prove the necessity of conventional hierarchy of beliefs for interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel et al. (2006) , Lemma 4). We only need to note that suppose we add nature as an independent player into the game, then IPCR is equivalent to interim correlated rationalizability and the information that ∆-hierarchy of beliefs incorporates is reduced to that of conventional hierarchy of beliefs. Of course, we can also prove that result directly with this technique.
Proof of sufficiency
Fix a game G 2 G. We need to show that if δ(
. Denote the set of all possible conjectures of player i in the k-th round of the elimination procedure by
Denote the set of marginals of
From the definition of rationalizability, the set of marginals on Θ A i determines the set of justifiable expected payoffs, thus determines the set of rationalizable actions. That is, if
Step 1. We start with the case of k = 1 and then prove the rest inductively. Consider the probability space
∆Θ as a random variable on T i , and denote the σ-algebra generated by it by σ(π i (t i , )).
Since T i is a compact metric space, there exists a regular conditional probability that (2004)). Since the conditional probability is σ(π i (t i , )) measurable, by a little abuse of notation, we can write it as π i (t i , ) : B i (t i ) ! ∆T i . Now, the marginal distribution for a given conjecture
We are ready to construct a conjecture v 0 for type t 0 i such that m v 0 = m v . Suppose t 0 i believes that the opponents are playing the following type-correlated strategy: for any
Intuitively, t 0 i believes that at all types t 0 i such that π 0 i (t 0 i , t 0 i ) = β, action a i is played with the average of the probabilities it is played with at types t i satisfying π i (t i ,
where the first and second equality are straightforward, the third equality comes from the construction of σ 0
, and the fourth equality is due to
We have shown that any marginal in marg
Step 2. We prove inductively for cases of k > 1. Suppose R T i,(k 1)
. Similar to step 1, we can express the
, and 0 otherwise. Again we can check that the induced marginal on Θ A i of the conjecture v 0 coincides with that of v. Following the same argument as in step 1,
Proof of necessity
Due to the consistency of ∆-hierarchy of beliefs, we can decompose the proof by discussing cases of
That is, in the k-th case, the ∆-hierarchies of beliefs at t i and t 0 i differ starting from the k-th level belief.
For each case, we construct a game that separates the types in their IPCR behavior. The construction of games is inductive.
Step 1 (k = 1). In the first step we consider the case of δ 1 (t i ) 6 = δ 1 (t 0 i ), i.e., when two types have different beliefs over conditional beliefs. We first present a special case of lemma 5 in Ely and Peski (2006) . (β) = max k2f1,...,mg N 1 β[ψ(k, θ) ], we have
Without loss of generality, suppose
. By the linearity of expectation, there exists λ > 0 such that
With Lemma 1 we construct a finite game
for player i to separate the behavior at types with first-order belief δ 1 (t i ) and types with first-order belief δ 1 (t 0 i ). Let A i = f0, 1g, and A j = f1, ..., mg, 8j 6 = i. Let the payoffs to the opponents be a constant, e.g., u j (a j , a j , θ) = 0, for all a j , a j , θ. Let the payoff to player i be
For two-player games with two payoff states, the payoff matrices can be expressed 
The maximal payoff is
, is greater than the payoff from playing a i = 0, which is 0, a i = 1 is rationalizable at t i . However, at type t 0 i , the maximal payoff from playing a i = 1 is δ 1 (t 0 i )[λ f 1] < 0. Therefore, playing a i = 1 is strictly dominated by playing a i = 0; a i = 1 is not rationalizable at t 0 i . That is, R i (t i ) 6 = R i (t 0 i ).
Step 2 (Induction). To carry out induction, we need a generalized version of Lemma 1, which is also adapted from Ely and Peski (2006) . ψ(k, θ) ] for some natural number m and continuous bounded
Lemma 2. The collection of sets fµ : µ[ f ] < 0g ∆(∆Θ), one for each f 2 F, generate the weak -topology on ∆(∆Θ). This topology is normal, and therefore any pair of disjoint closed subsets S, S 0 2 ∆(∆Θ) can be separated by open sets, and there is a function f 2 F such that 8µ 2 S and µ 0 2 S 0 ,
Since the proof to Lemma 2 is a special case of lemma 5 in Ely and Peski (2006) 
for some natural number m and a profile of vectors η 1 , ..., η m 2 [0, 1] n . We can prove that By applying Lemma 2, for any pair of disjoint closed subsets of first-order beliefs, we can construct a game that separates them in rationalizability. For any pair of disjoint closed subsets S, S 0 2 ∆(∆Θ), there is a game G(S, S 0 ) such that for all δ 1 2 S, 1 2
For any game G = (u i , A i ) i2N , the mapping t i ! R i (t i jG) defines the set of rationalizable actions for any profile of the opponents' types. For any set A, denote 2 A the set of subsets of A. For any measurable subset S ∆Θ 2 A i , let
We call ω(t i jG) 2 ∆(∆Θ 2 A i ) player i's rationalizable belief at t i . It is straightforward to see that rationalizable beliefs at types determine the sets of rationalizable conjectures and therefore the sets of best response actions. If δ 2 (t i ) 6 = δ 2 (t 0 i ), the two types must differ in their beliefs at some closed subset S i6 =j ∆(∆Θ), thus from above, there must be some pair of disjoint closed subsets S, S 0 j6 =i ∆(∆Θ) and a game G(S, S 0 ) that separates them such that ω(t i jG(S, S 0 )) 6 = ω(t 0 i jG(S, S 0 )). If player i believes the opponents are playing G(S, S 0 ), at t i , t 0 i she will have different sets of conjectures about opponents' actions and states of nature; this suggests that she will have different sets of rationalizable actions at t i and t 0 i given that her payoff function is properly designed, as is shown in the following result.
Theorem 2 (Ely and Peski (2006) , Theorem 3). If two types t i and t 0 i differ in terms of their rationalizable belief in game G, i.e., ω(t i jG) 6 = ω(t 0 i jG), then there is a finite game G 0 in which t i and t 0 i have distinct rationalizable sets, i.e., R i (t i jG 0 ) 6 = R i (t 0 i jG 0 ).
As an immediate result, if δ 2 (t i ) 6 = δ 2 (t 0 i ), then there is a finite game G 0 such that
The game G 0 can also be constructed directly without referring to Theorem 2. The construction of G 0 is very similar to the construction of G(δ 1 (t i ), δ 1 (t 0 i )) in step 1. It uses a lemma more general than Lemma 2. Let F be the set of f :
for some natural numbers m and m 0 , and continuous bounded function ψ : f1, ..., mg N 1
Lemma 3. The collection of sets fµ : µ[ f ] < 0g ∆(∆Θ 2 A i ), one for each f 2 F, generate the weak -topology on ∆(∆Θ 2 A i ). This topology is normal, and therefore any pair of disjoint closed subsets S, S 0 2 ∆(∆Θ 2 A i ) can be separated by open sets, and there is a function f 2 F such that 8µ 2 S and µ 0 2 S 0 ,
As a result of this lemma, there is a game G(S.S 0 ) that separates any pair of disjoint closed subsets S, S 0 of second-order beliefs. In this game, the action set of player i has a product structure, in which the first coordinate of each action represents the action that the opponents are playing against.
The induction works as follows. If δ 3 (t i ) 6 = δ 3 (t 0 i ), the two types must differ in their beliefs at some closed subset S 2 j6 =i ∆(∆(∆Θ)); hence there must be some pair of disjoint closed subsets S, S 0 2 j6 =i ∆(∆(∆Θ)) and a game G(S, S 0 ) that separate them such that ω(t i jG(S, S 0 )) 6 = ω(t 0 i jG(S, S 0 )). Applying Theorem 2 again, there must be a finite game G 0 such that R i (t i jG 0 ) 6 = R i (t 0 i jG 0 ). For δ k (t i ) 6 = δ k (t 0 i ), k 3, respective separating games can be constructed inductively by applying Lemma 3 and Theorem 2.
Discussions
We can be more explicit about the type-correlated strategy. It takes the form of a partially correlating device, which sends correlated signals (in the canonical form, recommendations) to players depending on their types while preserving players' conditional beliefs. Tang (2012) shows that such correlating devices characterize the correlations embedded among type spaces that have the same set of ∆-hierarchies of beliefs, then points out that belief-invariant Bayesian solution proposed by Forges (1993) is defined using exactly the same correlating devices.
In a closely related study, Liu (2012) characterizes the correlations embedded in type spaces generating the same set of conventional hierarchies of beliefs with state-dependent correlating devices; he also defines a notion of correlated equilibrium with such correlating devices. 9 Essentially, state-dependent correlating devices send correlated signals to players depending on the state of the world while preserving players' beliefs in the original type space, and they capture exactly the same form of correlations permitted in ICR.
The comparison between partially correlating devices with state-dependent correlating devices offers us another perspective on the distinction between IPCR and ICR, and similarly, on the distinction between ∆-hierarchy of beliefs and conventional hierarchy of beliefs.
The payoff equivalence between IPCR and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution is straightforward following the same idea used by Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) , who show that in complete information games, correlated rationalizability and a posteriori equilibrium are equivalent. The belief-invariant Bayesian solution is also studied in Forges (2006) , Bergemann and Morris (2011) , Lehrer et al. (2010) and Lehrer et al. (2013) . Among them, Lehrer et al. (2010) and Lehrer et al. (2013) focus on the payoff equivalence between information structures under various solution concepts. The idea behind partially correlating devices resembles that of the non-communicating garblings they use.
